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ABSTRACT: The goal of this paper is to simulate a tax shift from labour to consumption and perform a 
distributional analysis of the reform. Microsimulation programs are often uniquely focussed on the 
personal income tax system and on social security contributions and benefits. However, against a political 
background where income taxes are under increased pressure and alternative, less distortive forms of 
taxation come under consideration, microsimulation models enriched with expenditure data and 
consumption tax structures could play an important role in sharpening the (distributional) picture of such 
systemic changes. The current paper discusses an algorithm for this enrichment - mainly with VAT, 
excises and other consumption taxes - within the context of the EUROMOD-framework and applies the 
obtained program to the simulation of a decrease of social security contributions compensated by a rise 
in standard VAT rate to maintain government budget neutrality for four EU countries. The measure is 
found to have a (first order) regressive effect, pointing to the fact that keeping redistribution constant 
would require the remaining post-reform income taxation to become more progressive. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The current economic crisis and rising 
unemployment has put the plea for a reduction of 
the tax wedge on employment and an “alternative 
financing of the welfare state” again in the 
spotlight (see e.g. OECD, 2008). A major difficulty 
in the debate is that, although the arguments rest 
upon theoretical economic foundations
1, little is 
known about the concrete consequences of policy 
proposals on the government budget and the 
redistribution level in society. Indeed, the lack of 
reliable predictions may be one of the reasons 
why so few of the reform proposals are eventually 
put into practice. 
 
Since microsimulation models (MSM) are the tools 
par excellence for assessing the distributional 
impact of policy instruments, they form a good 
starting point in generating the desired 
predictions. Currently however, the prominent role 
of the consumption tax instrument both in practice 
(see figure 1 and 2) and in the public debate, 
stands in sharp contrast with the poor attention it 
got within the microsimulation community. 
Indeed, most MSM’s have focussed on the 
arithmetic micromodelling of personal income 
taxes, social security contributions and benefits, 
not indirect taxes, despite the relative simplicity of 
most VAT and excise systems. 
 
The basic reason for the omission of indirect taxes 
in standard MSM-modelling is of a practical nature: 
often the micro level income datasets used in tax 
                                                
1   Besides Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), which, 
even after more than 25  years, is still the 
reference to start with when studying the topic, 
see, among many others, Ahmad and Stern 
(1984), Boadway and Pestieau (2003) and 
Auerbach  (2006) for recent theoretical 
contributions on the direct-indirect tax mix. 
benefit microsimulation do not contain information 
on expenditures which is detailed enough to 
calculate indirect tax liabilities with sufficient 
precision. To overcome this shortcoming (besides 
more comprehensive socio-economic surveys, in 
the long run), one could either design a separate 
indirect tax microsimulation model, running on 
e.g. a budget survey dataset, or impute 
expenditure information into the income dataset 
underlying an existing tax benefit model. In this 
paper, we adopted the second strategy for two 
reasons. Firstly, budget surveys in many countries 
do not contain enough detailed information to 
enable a microsimulation model like EUROMOD to 
run upon it. In most cases disposable income is 
available and sometimes a gross income measure. 
But, a disaggregation according to income source 
is seldom available in budget surveys. Secondly, 
the microsimulation model used here, EUROMOD
2, 
makes standard use of European income datasets, 
the  EU-SILC, because of the detail of income 
variables that it provides as well as the advantage 
of it offering standardized datasets across the 
countries of the European Union. EU-SILC, however, 
has no or only very limited expenditure 
information. Hence, the first objective of the paper 
is to suggest an algorithm for dealing with missing 
expenditure and consumption tax information in 
the context of a direct tax-and-benefit simulation 
context, like EUROMOD. In practice, we have been 
able to use budget surveys of four countries 
(Belgium, Hungary, Ireland and the UK) and 
implement our method for them. 
 
The second objective of the paper is to simulate a 
concrete policy proposal involving a shift from 
labour to consumption tax, more specifically a 
25% decrease of social security contributions 
combined with an offsetting increase in the 
                                                
2   See Immervoll et al. (1999) for a description of 
the model. DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 42 
standard  VAT rate. While government budget 
neutrality is maintained, the analysis of the reform 
will focus on the distributional consequences. 
However, several caveats are in order in the 
interpretation of the results. First, the model is 
embedded in a partial equilibrium framework 
where producer prices are taken as exogenously 
given, which may be problematic since the price of 
labour changes
3. Moreover, the routine contains 
only an (Engel-curve based) behavioural model for 
consumption, but not for labour supply. Since a 
shift of revenue collection from social security 
contributions towards indirect taxes is mostly 
intended to stimulate labour market participation 
and/or labour supply, which of course affects the 
income redistribution, the results presented here 
can only be taken as first-order effects. The 
incorporation of a labour supply model is an issue 
that will be addressed in future work. 
 
 
                                                
3 The rise in VAT would not change producer 
prices since it is not levied on intermediary 
goods, contrary to a sales tax. DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 43 
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other taxes (including 








taxes on corporate 
income (1200)
taxes on personal 
income (1100)
taxes on specific 
goods and services 
(5120)
taxes on general 
consumption (5110)
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The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 
2 we describe the data that are available and the 
implementation of the indirect tax system in the 
model. The imputation of expenditure data in the 
EUROMOD datasets is considered in section 3. 
Finally, section 4 contains the description and the 
results of the combined direct-indirect tax 
simulations. 
2.  EXPENDITURE AND TAX DATA 
The countries for which the imputation of 
expenditures into an income dataset took place 
are Belgium, Hungary, Ireland and the UK. These 
countries formed the subject of subproject 3 in the 
AIM-AP-project, the aim of which was to enrich 
EUROMOD with expenditure information and an 
indirect tax module. Table 1 summarizes the 
income and expenditure datasets used for each 
country.

















































Typically, a euromod dataset contains socio-
demographic background variables like age, sex, 
education level etc., as well as income and 
personal income tax variables. Euromod then 
subsequently performs a number of policy 
modules, which may be actual or reform policies, 
on the input variables to obtain the household 
disposable income. 
Household budget surveys, on the other hand, 
consist of socio-demographic background 
variables, some of which overlap with those in the 
euromod datasets, and detailed expenditure 
information. To ensure comparability across these 
four countries, the same expenditure aggregation 
was used across the countries, close to the 
highest level of the coicop -scheme4. An indirect 
tax module was constructed, which calculated the 
average indirect tax rates for each coicop-
aggregate, by aggregating the VAT, ad valorem 
taxes and excise paid at the most detailed level of 
the available budget surveys across all 
commodities belonging to a specific coicop-
                                                
4   The aggregates involved are: Food and Non-
alcoholic drinks, Alcoholic drinks, Tobacco, 
Clothing and Footwear, Home fuels and 
electricity, Rents, Household services, Health, 
Private transport, Public transport, 
Communication, Recreation and Culture, 
Education, Restaurants and hotels, Other 
goods and services, Durables and Home 
production (wherever applicable). 
aggregate. This implicitly defined a VAT- and 
excise-rate for this specific coicop-aggregate, 
which was then applied to calculate indirect tax 
liabilities in the income surveys. More information 
on the calculation of these indirect tax liabilities 
for aggregate commodity groups can be found in 
Decoster et al. (2008). In the appendix we also 
present a flow chart with the different steps of 
imputation and simulation. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the VAT-structure for the four 
countries. The indirect tax legislation of the year 
of the expenditure survey was used, except for 
Ireland. The main change in indirect tax legislation 
between the year of the survey and the current 
legislation (as of 2009) has occurred in Hungary, 
where the standard rate has been lowered from 
25 to 20% and the reduced rate from 15 to 5%. 
This substantial change has to be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results. Also the temporary 
reduction of the VAT-rate from 17.5% to 15% in 
the UK as part of the macro-economic stimulus 
package, decided at the end of 2008, is not taken 
up. 
 
The excise duties, which are levied as an amount 
per unit of quantity rather than as a percentage of 
the producer price, differ a lot across the four 
countries. The tax base for excise duties however, 
i.e. the commodities on which an excise tax is 
levied, are more or less the same across the 
different countries. In summary, the excise DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 46 
products are: mineral oil products (gasoline, 
(un)leaded petrol, …), alcoholic products (spirits, 
beer, wine, …) and tobacco products (cigarettes, 
cigars, …). The Ad Valorem excise tax mostly 
concerns tobacco products. In order to make the 
VAT and excise systems comparable, excise duties 
are here expressed as implied tax rates (meaning 
as a function of observed expenditures and 
quantities) rather than on a unit basis. 
Table 2 VAT-structure and expenditure shares per vat-category; excise rates and shares for the 3 most 




















Alcohol Tobacco Private 
transpor
t 
BE-2003  Rates  21 0  6 12  43.9  162.9  34.7 
  Shares  41.9  37.9  19.8  0.4 1.7 1.3 8.9 
HU-2005  Rates  25 0  5 15  64.3  273.0  79.0 
  Shares  42.7 8.1  4.1 45.1 0.6  2.6  4.1 
IE-2001 Rates  20  0  -  12.5  26.6  300.0  75.4 
  Shares 36.2 42.0  -  21.8  4.5  3.4  5.3 
UK-2003  Rates  17.5  0  5  -  89.7 414.7 58.8 
  shares 57.7 36.3  6.1  -  1.9  2.2  8.0 
3.  IMPUTATION OF EXPENDITURES 
As stated earlier, we started from income datasets 
that are used in EUROMOD but contain no 
expenditure information. As far as the imputation 
of COICOP-expenditures in these income datasets is 
concerned, the relative performance of four 
different imputation methods was evaluated: 
using a distance function, grade correspondence, 
non parametric Engel curves and parametric Engel 
curves.
5 A detailed account of this comparison is 
found in Decoster et al. (2007). The final choice, 
based both on theoretical, empirical and practical 
arguments of future implementation in MSM-
models, was to use the parametric Engel curves 
                                                
5    Engelcurve is the general name for the 
relationship between expenditure shares and 
explanatory variables, which explain the 
variation of these shares across households. A 
wellknown explanatory variable consists of 
total expenditures or income. Rich or better-off 
households, e.g., have definitely different 
expenditures patterns than poor households. 
The share of food in the budget declines with 
income. Although the word Engelcurve is used 
to describe the general relationship (i.e. with 
all possible explanatory variables), it is 
sometimes used in the more narrow sense of 
the relationship between budget shares and 
income. 
(see e.g. Banks et al., 1997, for a thorough 
discussion). An Engel curve was estimated for 
each COICOP-aggregate on the expenditure dataset 
and used to predict values in the income dataset, 
using the specification: 
2 log( ) log ( ) i ii i share x x O α βγ =+ +
v
 
where x is a measure of income or total 
expenditures (cf. infra) and O is a vector of 
household characteristics common to both 
datasets. 
 
Three considerations are relevant in this context. 
Firstly, since the regressors used in the Engel 
curve have to be selected from variables that are 
common to both datasets, this puts a serious 
limitation on model specification. It also required a 
phase of thorough comparison and harmonization 
of these common variables. As an example, figure 
3 plots the quantiles of disposable income in the 
budget dataset as a function of the quantiles in 
the EUROMOD dataset for Belgium. Two conclusions 
can be drawn: first that there is a straight line 
component, pointing to equality of distributions, 
containing 98.7 % of the data; second, that there 
are divergences in the tails of the distributions. So 
for extremely low or high incomes, the matching 
procedure may not be very accurate. DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 47 
 
Figure 3  QQ-plot for disposable income quantiles in budget dataset (dib) versus quantiles in income 



































Secondly, using disposable income in the 
estimation of expenditures per category was 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the income 
distributions in the expenditure dataset used for 
estimation and the income dataset on which we 
impute often differ, especially in the tails, as 
indicated above. If the latter distribution has fatter 
tails, the imputation has the character of an 
extrapolation and is hence much less stable. This 
leads to some undesirable imputation properties, 
such as a large proportion of negative 
expenditures in each category and a large 
proportion of very high expenditures for some 
consumption categories. In the latter case, the 
implied savings rate becomes extremely negative 
in the income dataset. Secondly, disposable 
income in the expenditure datasets can be 
negative or 0, though in practice only in about 
0.1% of the cases. Reasons for this can be direct 
taxation, and in some countries loss or theft of 
stolen goods and loss of capital income. Note that 
this already makes the estimation of income 
shares very cumbersome. Moreover, it excludes 
the specification in terms of the logarithm of 
disposable income and its square, which is 
dominantly present in the literature. 
To deal with these problems the imputation was 
split up in two steps. First, total expenditures and 
total durable expenditures were estimated upon 
disposable income and the common socio-
demographic variables
6. The (empiric) relation 
between disposable income and total expenditures 
is much smoother and hence more robust to 
                                                
6   In fact, for the estimation of total expenditures 
(and also durables), a specification was used 
including disposable income and disposable 
income squared as independent variables. 
Hence, the direct estimation of the savings 
function instead of total expenditures would 
yield exactly the same imputed values. 
problems of the kind described above. These two 
estimated equations were then used to predict 
total expenditures and total durable expenditures 
in the EUROMOD dataset (and to construct total 
nondurable expenditures by taking the difference 
between the two). In the second step, nondurable 
budget shares for each nondurable category were 
constructed as the share of the category in total 
nondurable expenditure. These shares were then 
estimated by the formula above (using total 
nondurable expenditures as x). The obtained 
equations (one for each category) were then used 
to impute shares in the income dataset. In this 
way, both total nondurable expenditures and 
nondurable expenditure shares per category were 
present in the income dataset. By multiplying 
these, the expenditures per category could be 
derived. A priori, it cannot be excluded that this 
method yields negative budget shares in the 
imputation. But since there are no observed 
negative values and because of the smoothening 
effect on extreme incomes in the first step, in 
practice it did not occur in this exercise. A 
program line was however included that would set 
the negative budget shares to zero and would 
standardize the shares to sum to one in case this 
would occur for other datasets. 
 
A third remark concerns the replication of so 
called zero expenditures in the target dataset. 
Estimating a regression on a consumption 
aggregate like tobacco, which is not consumed by 
a majority of households, and then imputing 
tobacco expenditures, fails to reproduce a 
sufficient number of exact zeroes. For 
distributional analyses, this might produce a 
significant bias in the target dataset. The 
population was therefore divided into subgroups 
according to whether or not the households have 
expenditures on the different zero expenditure 
aggregates: smokers and non smokers, renters DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 48 
and home owners, users and non-users of public 
transport and users and non-users of education. 
Then it was assumed that all the 16 resulting 
subgroups have different preference structures. 
Hence, the Engel curves are estimated for each 
subgroup separately. To determine to which group 
a household in the income dataset belonged, a 
Tobit regression model was used for the group 
identification in the budget survey. For each zero 
expenditure variable, like smoking, an underlying 
propensity to smoke model was estimated in the 
budget survey. This model was then used to 
predict this probability for the observations in the 
income dataset. For each observation a random 
number was drawn from the inverse normal 
distribution function: if this number was smaller 
than the estimated probability, the observation 
was categorized as respectively a smoker, renter, 
etc. Finally the budget shares in the income 
dataset were predicted with the Engel curves for 
the right subgroup to complete the imputation 
procedure. When the subgroups were too small to 
estimate a model the technique of subgroup-
referencing was used (see Decoster et al., 2009).  
This boils down to increasing the number of 
observations, and hence reducing the variation of 
the estimates, by adding observations of other 
subgroups. However, because of the different 
preference structures of the groups, this 
introduces estimation bias. To reduce this bias a 
weighting scheme and dummy variables for the 
different subgroups are introduced.
7 
 
Table 3 gives a comparison between average 
observed expenditures per consumption aggregate 
in the budget survey and the average imputed 
value in the EUROMOD dataset, for the four 
countries. The results show that the imputation 
was fairly accurate, with some notable exceptions, 
e.g. the category food and non-alcoholic 
beverages in Ireland. This points to the fact that 
there is a large difference in the marginal 
distributions for some of the explanatory variables 
between the two datasets. For the particular case 
of Ireland, there was an overrepresentation of 
                                                
7   First, it makes sense only to use subgroups in 
the estimation that are “alike” to some degree. 
The explanation is straightforward: the less the 
true population parameters differ, the less the 
bias in estimated parameters if both groups are 
mixed together. Second, one can apply a 
weighting scheme so that observations in the 
subgroup itself have the highest weight, while 
other subgroups get a lower weight 
corresponding to their level of similarity with 
the original group. Notice that the first 
provision is a special case of the second one, in 
that subgroups considered to be not alike at 
all, get a weight of zero. Third, dummy 
variables can be used to draw off part of the 
bias. For instance, if one uses smokers to 
estimate the budget shares of a non-smoker, 
including a dummy for smoking will decrease 
the bias on other coefficient estimates. If there 
is no correlation between smoking or not and 
the other covariates, the bias will be zero. 
single-person, retired households in the budget 
survey (see Decoster et al., 2009), or an 
underrepresentation of these households in the 
EUROMOD dataset. Note that – in the absence of 
unaccounted interaction effects - this will not 
affect the conclusions presented here as long as 
the  EUROMOD dataset is representative for the 
population. Home production is not included in the 
table. DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 49 
 
Table 3  Average expenditures per consumption category in budget and EUROMOD dataset 
 
Commodity 
expenditures in €, 
BE 
expenditures in €, 
HU 
























4183 4050 1813 1675 4620 8215 2617 2121 
alcoholic 
beverages  466 400  82  36 1663  1513  325 296 
tobacco  275 279 191 170 644  1098  280 321 
clothing and 
footwear  1395 1284  442  380  1848 1493 1183  916 
home fuels 
and electricity  1321 1284  831  844  1128 1987  623  590 
rents  1418  1560 59  62  681 913 691 543 
household 
services  1268 1157  666  685  1230 1365  999  818 
health  1608  1507  245 323 582 391 174 144 
private 
transport  2660 2214  590  325  1394 1808 1814 1413 
public 
transport  161 158 185 148 513 534 292 242 
communicatio
n  803 758 460 437 739  1223  551 457 
recreation and 
culture  2058 1752  390  384  1931 2171 1760 1472 
education  207 141  76  76  405 368 529 248 
restaurants 
and hotels  2344 1972  246  153  1695 1652 2105 1746 
other goods 
and services  2491 2175  471  466  4869 3917 1408 1210 
Durables  2671 2372  656  658  5306 3384 3405 3212 
All  25330  23062 7645  7056 29248  32032  18754  15748 
4.  SIMULATIONS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
TAXATION 
Finally, matched income and expenditure data are 
used to simulate changes in indirect taxation and 
evaluate the distributional consequences of these 
changes for the four aforementioned countries. 
The social security contributions of the employees 
are decreased by 25%. Assuming government 
budget neutrality, the rise in the standard VAT 
rate necessary to compensate fully for this loss is 
calculated. Further assumptions are that the 
savings of the households are constant, as well as 
the amount of durable goods they purchase. Note 
that expenditure on durables can increase due to 
a rise in the VAT-rate. The households have the 
possibility to change their behaviour according to 
the Engel curves estimated in the imputation step. 
This means that only the direct effect of a rise in 
total nondurable expenditures on the budget 
shares of the aggregates is taken into account, 
not the cross price effects between the 
aggregates. 
To evaluate the distributional implications of the 
tax reform, a measure of consumption based 
welfare gain was adopted, as explained in Capéau 
et al. (2008). A summary is given below. 
 
Write the Marshallian demand functions as: 
( ) =, , f e xq  
where  x  and q  denote quantities and consumer 
prices
8 respectively. In this case the expenditure 
function for the non durable commodities 
becomes: 
( ) =, , ec U q  
U  denoting the welfare level obtained from the 
preference representation function  ( ) () , uf y q . 
This expenditure function is homogeneous of 
degree 0 in the level of non durable expenditures 
and consumer prices, allowing to transform each 
proportionate price change into a corresponding 
change of e . The function  (.) c  is the building 
block of the money metric welfare function (see 
King, 1983). E.g. for a household with non durable 
expenditures 
0 e  and facing prices 
0 q  welfare is 
measured as:  
                                                
8   In this context, we follow the general notation 
used in optimal tax theory to use q to refer to 
consumer prices, to be distinguished from 
producer prices, generally denoted by p. DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 50 
( ) () ()
00 00 (,,) = , , ,
rr me c u f e qq q q  
where 
r q  is a set of reference prices to convert 
welfare 
0 U  in the situation 
00 (,) e q  into 
monetary units. Now use as reference prices the 
baseline prices 
0 q . The welfare change due to the 
change in nominal non durable expenditures (from 
0 e  to 
1 e ) and in consumer prices (from 
0 q  to 
1) q  is then calculated as follows: 
() ( )
() () () () () ()
010 1 0 1 0 0
01 1 00 0
(,,,) , ,
=, , , ,,
W G e ecUcU






where  () ()
11 1 , Uu f e ≡ q  denotes the utility level 
in the post-reform situation and WG denotes the 
welfare gain. 
 
The second term in the last equation equals 
0 e . 
The first term in the right hand side of equation 
embodies the counterfactual situation of reaching 
the post-reform utility level at the pre-reform 
prices. This can be calculated by means of the 
Hicksian, or compensated demand functions, 
denoted here as: 






,= , . i
i
cUe q hU
∗ ≡ ∑ qq  
These compensated demands only take-up the 
real income effect, leaving relative prices 
unchanged. Hence they correspond to the 




















∗∗ ∑  
The welfare gain is then calculated as: 
0101 0 (,,,) = . WG e e e e
∗ − qq  
Note that this welfare gain can be decomposed 
into three different effects: one effect coming 
from the change in nominal non durable 
expenditures, an effect coming from the change in 
the aggregate price level of the nondurable 
consumer items, discarding the relative price 
change, and an effect coming from the change in 
the relative prices of the non durable consumer 
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The first term in the above expression is the 
change in nominal non durable expenditures. But 
this difference would be an overestimation of the 
welfare gain. The other two terms in squared 
brackets give the effect of the changing consumer 
prices. The first is the change in the general price 
level, discarding the relative price change. 
Concretely, it is an aggregate measure of price 
changes, namely the weighted average of the 
individual price changes, weighted by the 
quantities  i x
∗ (to be interpreted as the Hicksian 
quantities, after adjusting the price level in a 
proportionate way). The inclusion of this term is 
intuitive: a rise in the general price level 
decreases the gain in welfare as measured by 
nominal expenditures alone, since one can 
purchase fewer quantities with the same money. 
The second term between square brackets, 
2 Δ q , 
accounts then for the relative price effect, i.e. for 
the changing of the slope of the budget constraint. 
With our specific assumptions, 
1 = ii x x
∗ , and hence 
the third price-change-term 
2 Δ q  vanishes. The 
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The last expression is very intuitive: to measure 
the welfare impact one looks at changes in 
quantities. These changes are evaluated at pre 
reform prices. The first expression allows for a 
decomposition of the welfare gain in an 
expenditure and a price effect. This decomposition 
will be used in the tables. 
 
The results are summarized in the following three 
tables. Table 4 presents the changes in the 
government budget. The decrease of the social 
security contributions of the employees by 25% 
leads to a substantial necessary increase in the 
standard  VAT-rate: 4 to 5 percentage points in DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 51 
Belgium, Ireland and the UK. But up to 9 
percentage points for Hungary. It is clear that the 
r i s e  i n  s t a n d a r d  V A T  r a t e  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  
relative importance of the social security 
contributions and the indirect tax system. Note 
that for Belgium, part of the government’s loss is 
recuperated by an increase in taxable income and 
hence by a rise in personal income tax. The other 
countries do not exclude social security 
contributions from the taxable base and hence 
their PIT revenue stays the same. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the welfare consequences for 
different subgroups of society. For each group and 
country, the average change in welfare WG is 
depicted, together with its two components: the 
change in nondurable expenditures and the price 
effect. The first component is everywhere positive, 
explained by the fact that disposable income can 
only increase by the tax reform and because 
savings are kept constant
9. 
 
The second component represents the price effect, 
which captures the rise in price levels. As no 
goods have their prices decreased, this effect is 
negative for every household. Taken together, one 
can see from table 4 that the price effect 
dominates the change in expenditures in the lower 
equivalized expenditure deciles, so that the 
welfare effect of the reform is negative for those 
groups. For the higher deciles, the situation is 
reversed and these groups become better off after 
the reform. 
This analysis of gainers and losers can be carried 
out for other subgroups of the population as well. 
The upper rows of table 5 show the effects along 
the division poor – non poor, where poverty is 
defined as having equivalized expenditures lower 
than 60% of the median equivalized expenditures. 
As can be expected from the previous table, the 
reform is beneficiary to the group of non poor as a 
whole, but the group of poor is affected very 
badly. The same conclusion can be drawn for 
socio-economic divisions as in the lower part of 
the third table: people in more vulnerable 
positions, like the unemployed (except for 
Hungary, where they are almost unaffected), 
retired people and people receiving income 
support, lose by the reform, while employed 
workers gain by it. 
                                                
9 There is a possibility, however, that the price 
rise of durables outweighs the increase in 
disposable income. E.g. a household that pays 
no social security contribution and therefore 
cannot enjoy the benefits of the tax reform will 
see its total nondurable expenditures 
diminished if it has strictly positive 
expenditures on durables. On the aggregated 
levels that are used here, this effect is not 
directly observable. In Belgium, this group of 
households constitutes 0.6% of the population, 
in Hungary 0.4%, in Ireland 1.1% and in the 
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Table 4  Revenue effects of the simulation 
 
 BE HU  IE  UK 
 baseline  simulation baseline  simulation  baseline simulation baseline  simulation 
SIC 
employee 
17,490 -3,900  2,777  -693  168,875  -33,902  42,283 -9,713 
PIT 35,500  +1,763  4,608  +0 1136,416  +0 164,813 +0 
Indirect 
tax 
14,400 +2,309  4,300  +731  443,139 34,791 71,717  +10,655 
VAT  rate  21% 26% 25% 34% 20%  23.5%  17.5%  21.5% 
 







































1  43 -193  -150  22  -70  -47 0 -59  -58 9  -50  -42 
2 79  -262  -183  34  -90  -56  38  -152  -114  39  -99  -60 
3 159  -308  -149  57  -105  -48  108  -202  -94  90  -134  -44 
4 237  -366  -129  82  -124  -41  213  -277  -64  134  -168  -34 
5 389  -417  -28  112  -139  -27  321  -313  8  196  -200  -4 
6 482  -455  26  141  -157  -16  364  -328  36  278  -233  45 
7 614  -509  105  192  -183  9  390  -338  52  360  -269  91 
8 735  -557  178  231  -205  26  483  -403  80  473  -316  158 
9 837  -607  230  310  -237  73  523  -399  124  620  -376  245 
10  1162  -858 305 527  -339 188  722 -531 191  764  -570 194 
Mean 473 -453  20  171  -165 6  316  -300  16 296  -241  55 
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Table 6  Decomposition of welfare change into total expenditure effect and price change – by group 
 
group 






























poor 55  -367  -312  30  -90  -60  4 -22  -18  17  -177  -160 
non 
poor 




0  -277  -277 0 -106  -106 0  -24  -24 0 -232  -232 
retired 112 -289  -177  117  -120  -3  22  -46  24 35 -164  -130 
unem- 
ployed 
54  -323 -269  35  -107 -72  2  -7  -5  16  -148  -133 
mean  473 -453 20  171  -165 6  316 -300  16 296 -241 55 
 
The regressive nature of the tax reform reflects 
essentially the regressive nature of indirect 
taxation with respect to income. This, in itself, 
follows from the progressivity of savings, as 
shown in table 7, meaning that the more income a 
household has, the more it saves. Indeed, if 
indirect tax rates are expressed in terms of total 
expenditures rather than income, the resulting 
image shows proportionality or even a slight 
progressivity for all four countries, caused by a 
differentiated tax structure whereby necessities 
often are subject to a reduced rate (cf. table 2). 
However, the progressivity or regressivity of taxes 
is not the only factor that plays a role. For 
instance, in table 5, the magnitude of the welfare 
changes is larger in Belgium than in the other 
countries. The reason of this is not that social 
security contributions are more progressive or the 
VAT system is more regressive in Belgium than in 
other countries. The larger distributional effect of 
the reform in Belgium is explained by the fact that 
social security contributions are more important in 
the sense that the average tax rate is higher. 
The principle underlying this argument is that the 
redistributive effect of a tax, the extent to which it 
decreases inequality, is a function both of its 
progressivity and its average rate. Table 8 shows 
the Suits index (progressivity) of the personal 
income and consumption tax system in the four 
countries studied in the left panel, and the 
redistributive effect (roughly the Gini index before 
minus after tax
10) of the systems in the right 
panel. So in Belgium, the progressivity of the 
entire tax system is lower than in Hungary, but 
the redistribution is higher due to a higher 
average tax rate. 
The regressive effect of the reform in table 5 could 
thus be observed even if indirect taxes had been 
progressive, as long as they had been less 
                                                
10  Actually it is the difference between a Gini and 
a concentration index, since the ordering 
variable is equivalized income before tax in 
both terms. 
progressive than the social security contributions. 
Essential for the reduction in redistribution is that 
the weight (average tax rate) of a more 
progressive tax is lowered and the weight of a less 
progressive tax is increased. However, with 
respect to the possible shift from income to 
consumption tax this also means that the 
redistributive effect could be kept constant, 
namely by increasing the progressivity of the 
remaining income tax (under the assumption that 
the progressivity of the indirect taxes does not 
change) 
Table 7  Savings rate per decile 
 
Deciles BE  HU  IE  UK 
1  -63.4  -50.4 -109.9 -37.1 
2 -17.5  -14.3  -67.3  1.7 
3 -8.1  -3.9  -38.8  10.4 
4 -2.1  1.6  -25.0  16.3 
5 3.8  6.4  -22.3  21.3 
6 9.3  10.1  -11.2  24.2 
7 13.3  12.1  -2.9  28.6 
8 18.0  14.4  4.5  32.5 
9 22.7  17.6  15.4  37.8 
10 33.3  27.1  38.5  50.4 DECOSTER - LOUGHREY - O’DONOGHUE – VERWERFT     Microsimulation of indirect taxes 54 
 
Table 8  Suits and Reynolds-Smolensky index for personal income and indirect taxes 
 
Country  PIT
S π  
IND
S π  
TOT
S π  
PIT
RS π  
IND
RS π  
TOT
RS π  
Belgium 0.219 -0.079  0.113  0.057  -0.010  0.046 
Greece  0.492  -0.101  0.094  0.035  -0.024       0.01 
Hungary 0.424 -0.086  0.144  0.056  -0.015  0.041 
Ireland 0.140  -0.143  0.044  0.043  -0.019  0.024 
UK 0.200  -0.120  0.092  0.038  -0.011  0.026 
Note: 
Y
S π denotes the Suits index for tax component Y, 
Y
RS π the Reynolds-Smolensky index; the superscript 
PIT refers to Personal Income Taxes, IND to Indirect Taxation and TOT to Personal Income Taxes and Indirect 
taxation. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a method to integrate indirect 
taxes within the EUROMOD microsimulation 
framework. Expenditure information is imputed by 
means of Engel curves estimated on expenditure 
surveys. The indirect tax system for each country 
is summarized by calculating implicit tax rates per 
consumption aggregate, so that indirect taxes can 
be calculated as a fraction of the imputed 
expenditures.  
 
The combination of income and direct tax data on 
the one hand and expenditures and indirect tax 
data on the other hand are used to simulate a 
possible shift from income to consumption tax. A 
25% decrease of social security contributions is 
simulated in EUROMOD. The loss in government 
revenue is compensated by raising the standard 
VAT-rate. Behavioural responses are allowed by 
recalculating budget shares with Engel curves. 
The increase in VAT-rate ranges from 2.5 to 9 
percentage points. The precise percentage is a 
function of the possibility of other sources for 
compensation of government revenue loss (as in 
Belgium) and the relative size of indirect taxes 
and social security contributions.  
The consumption based welfare measure shows 
that the policy change has a regressive effect with 
the lower total nondurable expenditure deciles 
losing. Although the disposable income rises in 
every decile, for the lower deciles this effect is 
surpassed by the effect of rising prices, even with 
savings kept constant. A way to counter this 
decrease in redistribution consists in increasing 
the progressivity of the remaining income tax 
system. 
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APPENDIX: FLOW CHART OF IMPUTATION 
AND SIMULATION 
The figure below depicts a flow chart of the 
imputation and simulation steps. The upper left 
box represents the expenditure survey. For all M 
households, it contains disposable income and 
socio-demographic variables also present in the 
EUROMOD income dataset (hence the name 
“common variables”), and expenditures at a very 
detailed level. The upper right box contains 
information about the indirect tax rates for every 
consumption item at this most detailed level of the 
expenditure survey, as well as a variable 
(“coicop”) that indicates to which consumption 
aggregate a consumption item belongs.  
 
We first calculate indirect taxes per item and per 
household in the budget dataset at this most 
detailed level. We then aggregate expenditures 
and taxes into 17 COICOP aggregates. This 
generates the “expenditure aggregates and 
indirect taxes” dataset on the second layer of the 
flow chart. This newly constructed dataset is used 
to estimate Engel curve coefficients for the 
consumption categories and to calculate implicit 
indirect tax rates for the aggregates. 
 
The EUROMOD income dataset originally consists of 
common variables and income and tax variables 
under a baseline and a reform condition. Via the 
Engel curves obtained earlier, expenditure 
information on the 17 aggregates is imputed for 
every household in the baseline. The aggregate 
indirect tax rates are then used to calculate the 
corresponding indirect tax variables (per 
consumption category). Moreover, since 
disposable income is different in the reform 
condition, the consumption patterns also change. 
These “reform expenditures” are also derived from 
the Engel curves. 
 
During the simulation phase, the idea is to 
compensate the loss in government budget due to 
a direct tax reform (calculated by EUROMOD) with 
e.g. a rise in the standard VAT rate. First the new 
consumption patterns resulting from the direct tax 
change (in most cases a rise in disposable 
income) are simulated using the Engel curves. 
This is achieved by altering the detailed VAT 
information in the tax file in the upper right corner 
(e.g. raising the rate by one point), calculating 
new aggregate tax rates and applying these on 
the reform expenditures. If the rise in indirect tax 
liabilities is enough to compensate the 
government for the direct tax loss, the algorithm 
stops. If not, the standard VAT rate is raised by 
another point and so on, until budget neutrality is 
reached. 









Expenditure aggregates and indirect taxes
Commonvars Aggregate EXP      Indirect taxes














EXP1  … EXP17 REXP1 … REXP17
Calculated indirect taxes
Indirect taxes Reform indirect taxes
TAX1  … TAX17 RTAX1… RTAX17
Detailed taxcode
Coicop aggr. 1-17     VAT       Excise
I1 12 0.21
I2 1                           0.06
…
iK 12
Engel curve coefficients Aggregate indirect 
tax rates
Is the combined reform budget neutral?
END
Raisestandard VAT 
rate with one unit YES NO
 
 
 
 